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Abstract In this paper we argue that formal exchanges with
poor consumers in emerging markets are hard to create and
maintain, resulting in widespread market failure. More specif-
ically, in emerging markets the institutions required for ex-
change either function poorly or are entirely absent, making
it difficult for sellers to deliver affordable and accessible of-
ferings to poor buyers in a financially sustainable manner. The
marketing challenge thus becomes (1) developing a viable
business model to facilitate market-based exchanges and (2)
shaping the institutions needed to implement this business
model. Drawing on institutional theory and extending it with
insights from the marketing and business model innovation
literatures, we develop a model of exchange in emerging mar-
kets. At the heart of our model is the idea that sellers often
need to act as institutional entrepreneurs in order to create and
deliver value when marketing to the poor in emerging mar-
kets. We discuss the implications of our model for future re-
search on marketing, exchange and emerging economies, as
well as the implications for managers seeking to market to the
poor in emerging economies.
Keywords Emergingmarkets . Poor consumers .Marketing
exchange
Marketing is the Bsocial and managerial process by
which individuals and groups obtain what they need
and want through creating and exchanging products
and values with others.^ Kotler et al (2008).
BAs emerging markets evolve from the periphery to the
core of marketing practice, we will need to contend with
their unique characteristics and question our existing
practices and perspectives, which have been historically
developed largely in the context of industrialized
markets.^ Sheth (2011)
At its core, marketing is the study of how firms create and
maintain exchanges with customers (Bagozzi 1974, 1975; Hunt
1983; Houston and Gassenheim 1987; Vargo and Lusch 2004).
Several decades of research have resulted in an impressive body
of knowledge about how marketers should and do create and
maintain such exchanges. Almost all of this knowledge, how-
ever, is based either implicitly or explicitly on a study of mar-
keting in developed economies. Very little work has examined
how firms create and capture value in emerging economies and
virtually no work examines how this is done among the poorest
segments of those economies (see Viswanathan et al. 2010).
Yet, over 2.5 billion people—nearly half the world’s pop-
ulation—live on less than $2 a day. Our understanding of how
to market to the majority of the world’s inhabitants is neg-
ligible, and the field of marketing is impoverished by its
lack of knowledge about such issues of macro importance
(see Mick 2007). Moreover, marketing to the poor in
emerging markets poses significant challenges that do not
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exist in developed economies (see Mahajan and Banga
2006; Wu 2013). For instance, the institutions required
for the creation and maintenance of exchanges are often
non-existent or fragmented in emerging markets (Khanna
and Palepu 2000). Specifically, these markets frequently
lack the institutions that help with assessing customer pref-
erences (e.g. market research firms that specialize in poor
segments) and responding to customer preferences (e.g. the
absence of a distribution and sales infrastructure that
reaches the poor) (Prahalad 2010). The attempt to create
and maintain exchanges with the poor in emerging econo-
mies therefore requires a different approach to marketing
than in developed economies (see Pauwels et al. 2013).
In this paper, we develop a model to examine the creation
and maintenance of exchanges with the poor in emerging
economies. To do so, we first explore why marketing to the
poor in emerging markets entails a unique set of challenges
relative to marketing in developed economies. We then argue
that responding to these unique challenges (e.g. the lack of
institutions that facilitate formal exchange) requires the crea-
tion of new business models that deliver an attractive value
proposition to poor consumers in a financially viable and sus-
tainable manner. Finally, we show how implementing such
business models requires institutional entrepreneurship,
namely working with existing institutions to create an envi-
ronment that enables the business model and hence exchange
to succeed. In sum, we show that marketers facilitate ex-
change in emerging economies by molding and re-molding
existing fragmentary institutions or creating new institutions
to deliver a value proposition in a financially viable manner.
Given the relative newness of the phenomenon we are
studying and the lack of marketing theory in this area, our
focus in this paper is on initiating theory development rather
than assessing, enhancing or testing theory (Bansal and
Clelland 2004; Cohen and Dean 2005; see Darden 1991). As
such, following Yadav (2010) we employ multiple strategies
for such theory development. Specifically, bringing institu-
tional theory to bear on the phenomenon of creating and fa-
cilitating exchange with the poor in emerging markets enables
us to draw analogies, invoke theory types, exploit interrela-
tions, and move to new levels of analysis in order to spur
theory development. Institutional theory is an established con-
ceptual approach in sociology and organization science that
has been applied to a range of social and technological con-
texts but seldom explicitly to exchanges involving the world’s
poor (see Battilana and Dorado 2010; Tracey and Phillips
2011). However, as we show below, by combining institution-
al theory with existing knowledge in marketing and innova-
tion, we are able to shed a great deal of light on the phenom-
enon of exchange with the poor. In particular, adopting an
institutional lens allows us to consider the buyer-seller dyad
in the context of the broader social processes within which
innovation and exchange take place, thus helping us to draw
analogies, exploit interrelations and incorporate multiple
levels of analysis in our theorizing.
By building a framework that is designed to increase our
understanding of marketing to the poor in emerging markets,
we make three main contributions. First, we extend existing
marketing theory to include a wider set of conditions, namely
those that exist among poor segments in emerging economies.
While a small number of marketing scholars have begun to
consider the distinctive challenges of marketing in emerging
markets (e.g., Baker 2009; Viswanathan et al. 2010), our un-
derstanding of marketing in this context remains limited. In
developing our arguments, we respond to calls for more con-
ceptual work in marketing and for marketing to broaden its
relevance (see Kohli 2009; Yadav 2010).
Second, we develop and integrate with marketing theory
the concepts of business model innovation and institutional
entrepreneurship to build a more systemic and strategic view
of marketing. These concepts and their accompanying theo-
rizing have become central to the fields of strategy and orga-
nization theory, enabling those fields to engage with important
issues of relevance to businesses worldwide (see Garud et al.
2002; Maguire et al. 2004; Zott and Amit 2008; Baden-Fuller
and Morgan 2010; Teece 2010; Casadesus-Masanell and
Ricart 2010; Thompson and MacMillan 2010; Tracey et al.
2010). By engaging with these concepts and building on them
from a marketing viewpoint, we respond to calls by leading
marketers for a focus on strategic and macro rather than mere-
ly tactical elements of marketing theory and methods (see
Reibstein et al. 2009; Kumar 2004; Vargo and Lusch 2004;
Varadarajan 2010; Day 1992; Mick 2007). We also hope, in
the process, to forestall the ceding of terrain to cognate disci-
plines like strategy and organization theory, especially in areas
that fall squarely within the purview of marketing.
Third, our framework has practical implications for firms
seeking to engage poor consumers in emerging economies.
Given the large numbers of such consumers, and their increas-
ing ability and desire to consume, makes them attractive cus-
tomer segments to serve. Yet, marketing to these segments also
present firms from both developed and emerging economies
with some severe difficulties. Specifically, while multinationals
from developed economies stand to gain new sources of reve-
nue from marketing to the poor in emerging markets, they also
face significant challenges due to their relative lack of knowl-
edge of such segments (Prahalad 2010). Conversely, while do-
mestic firms from emerging economies have a relative advan-
tage in terms of knowledge about these segments, they face
equally significant challenges in scaling up their solutions to
achieve a profitable scale and scope (Anderson et al. 2010).
This paper therefore has the potential to help marketers of both
types of firms to overcome the challenges they face in creating
and capturing value in emerging economies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we
briefly introduce the concepts of business models and
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business model innovation before setting out a framework for
studying exchange in emerging markets. We employ this
framework to examine market failures and the challenges in-
volved in creating and maintaining exchanges with the poor in
emerging economies. Next, we develop an institutional model
of exchange with the poor in emerging economies. And we
conclude with a discussion of the implications of our model
for research and practice.
Business model innovation
The rise of digital technologies and e-commerce has made it
necessary for managers and academics to rethink traditional
ways of doing business. This in turn has led to the coining of
the concept of a business model, described by Osterwalder
et al. (2005) as a Bblueprint^ for how to run a business.
While there is still some dispute regarding how exactly to
define a business model, there is general agreement that busi-
ness models: 1) are a new unit of analysis that span beyond the
firm, 2) provide a more holistic approach to describing how a
firm does business and 3) focus on both creating and capturing
value (see Zott et al. 2011).
Further, the literature on business models is broadly con-
cerned with two issues. First, it is concerned with how firms
use business models to create and capture value. The focus here
is on how new technologies require a change in how the business
is run in order to enable the creation and capture of value from
customers (for example, see Mahadevan 2000; Amit and Zott
2001; Daft and Lewin 1993). Second, the literature is concerned
with how the business model itself drives organizational innova-
tion. The key question here is how business model innovation
can drive organizational change and renewal, generate new
sources of competitive advantage and lead to better performance
(see for example Mitchell and Coles 2003).
Most of the growing literature on business models and
business model innovation is based on business in developed
markets. In developed economies, market based exchanges
are generally supported by well-functioning financial, legal
and social institutions, all of which facilitate such exchanges.
The literature is, however, generally silent on how these con-
cepts apply (or not) to emerging markets. Indeed, for reasons
we elaborate on below, we argue that the existing literature is
less applicable to firms operating in emerging markets.
Specifically, emerging markets differ from developed markets
in two important ways. First, they are characterized by a large
proportion of their populations living and working in the in-
formal economy: this means that most consumers have low
incomes, typically earn and spend on a daily basis, and operate
beyond the reach of formal institutions such as banks and
courts. Second, emerging markets either lack or have poorly
functioning institutions that facilitate market based exchanges.
The combination of large numbers of informal economy
consumers and poorly functioning institutionsmeans that emerg-
ing economies are often characterized by market failures in core
areas such as energy, health, education and finance. Thus, firms
that operate in emerging markets face particular challenges in
creating and capturing value through market based exchanges.
We argue, therefore, that the nature of the business models need-
ed to succeed in emerging markets differs from those in devel-
oped economies. We also argue that the process by which firms
develop and implement these business models differs from the
process needed in developed economies.
In the next section, we focus on the causes of market failure
in emerging markets. We use this as a basis to develop a
theoretical model of how firms can implement business model
innovations to overcome these market failures and create via-
ble exchanges particularly with the low-income consumers
that form the majority of customers in emerging markets. In
this context, we define business model innovation as finding a
way to deliver an attractive value proposition to poor con-
sumers in a financially viable and sustainable manner (see
Prahalad 2010; Anderson and Markides 2007; Anderson
et al. 2010). Specifically, this involves innovations in how
the firm generates revenues while managing its costs.
Exchange in emerging markets: a model of exchange
and market failures
We draw on existing research in marketing to develop a general
framework for the study of exchange (see Fig. 1). In identifying
the key elements in the process of exchange we distinguish
between focal and contextual elements. The focal elements of
exchange include the seller, the buyer, and the offering itself
(the marketing mix). The contextual elements include the insti-
tutions (both formal and informal) that potentially facilitate (or
hinder) exchanges between sellers and buyers. These include
financial institutions such as banks; social institutions such as
family, clan or caste; cultural institutions such as social norms
and practices; legal institutions such as the protection of prop-
erty rights; and marketing institutions such as market research
agencies, and distribution and sales agents.
We use this general framework to understand the condi-
tions needed for exchange to take place between sellers and
buyers from poor segments of emerging markets. Specifically,
we examine a condition that particularly marks such ex-
changes: namely, market failure. We discuss details of this
condition to show how marketing to poor segments in emerg-
ing economies differs from marketing to consumers in more
developed economies.
Market failure among the poor in emerging markets
A distinguishing feature of the economic life of poor con-
sumers in emerging economies is the prevalence of market
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failure for even basic needs such as financial services, energy
and healthcare. For instance, some 2.2 billion adults in Africa,
Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East have no access to
formal banking facilities (Chaia et al. 2009). Similar numbers
of people live without access to the electricity grid and there-
fore do not benefit from regular sources of lighting and energy
(Tanaka et al. 2010). Consequently, poor consumers have to
rely on informal sources to supply these needs, leading to sub-
optimal outcomes such as irregular supply, poor quality of
supply or high prices (see Hammond et al. 2007).
We define market failure as a situation in which there is
inefficient allocation of goods and services in a market (see
Ledyard 2008). This means that there exist other forms of
exchange which would leave buyers better off than the
existing forms of exchange. But what explains this kind of
market failure on a grand scale in emerging markets? More
specifically, why do formal market exchanges for so many
essential goods and services fail to occur among poor con-
sumers in emerging economies? Drawing on the framework
above, we argue that such market failure could be due to
factors that operate on either the demand or supply side, in-
volving both focal and contextual elements of exchange. See
Tables 1 and 2 for details of causes of market failures for the
examples discussed in this paper.
Demand side reasons for market failure
Assuming that the need for basic services such as finance,
energy and healthcare exists, there are three main reasons for
market failure from the point of view of buyers: lack of aware-
ness, lack of accessibility and lack of affordability (see
Prahalad 2010; Anderson and Markides 2007; Anderson
et al. 2010; Kashyap and Raut 2006; Mahajan 2008;
Mahajan and Banga 2006).
First, buyers may not be aware of the existence of a market
offering that better satisfies their needs or how an existing
market offering is used. Given the relative lack of marketing
institutions such as media and advertising services targeted at
these segments, poor consumers are likely to be relatively
uninformed about the range of existing market solutions.
Although the rapid spread of satellite television coupled with
the longstanding prevalence of radio services among the poor
mean that awareness is becoming less of a hindrance to ex-
change, it is certainly more difficult for poor consumers in
emerging economies to learn about possible market solutions
than their counterparts in developed economies. An example
of this can be seen in India where 27% of all deaths occur with
no medical attention at the time of death (Sivakumar 2015).
This is to a great extent because the poor are unaware of
services they can avail themselves of in a medical emergency.
For instance, they are very unlikely to be aware of an emer-
gency number to call, partly because there is the lack of a
national equivalent to a 911 facility. Further, the poor often
associate ambulance services with the transportation of de-
ceased patients rather than with medical care which might
prevent death, and therefore often avoid calling ambulance
services (see Johar and Harries 2010).
Second, even if poor consumers are aware of market offer-
ings to satisfy their needs, they might not be able to access
such solutions easily (Mahajan and Banga 2006). For exam-
ple, in the case of banks, the relative lack of infrastructure
often means that bank branches are few and far between in
the rural areas where the bulk of the world’s poor live (see
Basu and Srivastava 2005). The lack of accessibility also af-
fects the healthcare industry. India, for instance, has 20million
blind people, of whom 80% are visually impaired due to cur-
able cataracts. This in turn is because two thirds of the
country’s eye care infrastructure is concentrated in urban
areas, leaving rural areas (where the majority of the population
lives) without access to adequate eye care (see Chaudhary
et al. 2012; Rangan 2009; Karamchandani et al. 2009).
Finally, even if poor consumers are aware of better market
offerings and are able to access them, they might not be able to
afford such offerings. In the case of financial services, for in-
stance, the monthly management fee that poor consumers must
pay to keep a bank account open might not justify the potential
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Fig. 1 A Framework for the
Study of Exchange
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benefits of such a service (see Dupas and Robinson 2010). Or
again, in East Africa, because accessing electricity from the
grid is often impossible, large parts of the population are forced
to spend 20% of their income on kerosene solely for lighting
(Crainer 2013; Aglionby 2016).
Taken together, the relative lack of institutions in emerging
markets that enable exchange are likely to result in poor con-
sumers frequently being unable to enter into formal exchanges
with sellers of market offerings.
Supply side reasons for market failure
From the viewpoint of suppliers, there are three main reasons
for market failure in exchanges involving poor consumers in
emerging markets: lack of awareness of a given market oppor-
tunity, lack of the means to reach poor consumers, and the lack
of an economical means of initiating and fulfilling exchange
with such consumers (Prahalad 2010; Anderson andMarkides
2007; Anderson et al. 2010; Kashyap and Raut 2006;Mahajan
2008; Mahajan and Banga 2006).
First, sellers might not be aware of the market opportunity
for their offerings among poor consumers. Given the relative
lack of marketing institutions such as market research agen-
cies that specialize in these segments, sellers may have limited
knowledge of the nature and extent of the market opportunity
offered by poor consumers in emerging markets. In the ab-
sence of thorough market research, sellers all over the world
fall victim to the typical myopia of assuming (all) consumers
are like themselves. Foreign multinationals, for instance, often
talk to only a few people in the emerging markets they are
entering, because they incorrectly believe that those few peo-
ple represent the entire country or are aware of major devel-
opments in it. In Mexico, for example, 34% of the population
lives in poor quality housing. CEMEX, the country’s largest
producer of building materials, realized that this segment rep-
resented a large proportion of their end-users with whom they
had never directly interacted and who they therefore knew
very little about. In order to reach this large untapped market,
the company had to invest heavily in market research to better
understand the needs of this segment (see Segel et al. 2006;
London and Lee 2006; London et al. 2012).
Second, even if sellers are aware of the market opportunity,
they might not be able to reach these consumers easily. The
remoteness of many of the world’s poor from urban centers,
combined with the relative lack of distribution and sales infra-
structure in emerging economies, means that reaching poor
consumers is likely to be very difficult if not impossible in
many cases. In Asia and Africa, multinational firms in sectors
like fast moving consumer goods face a huge supply chain
challenge in reaching the upwards of 50% of the population
that lives in remote rural areas. In India, for instance, Unilever
faces the twin challenge of poor transport infrastructure and
over 300,000 small villages dispersed across the country; taken
together these challenges make traditional supply chain struc-
tures economically unviable (see Rangan and Rajan 2007).
Finally, even if sellers are aware of market opportunities
among poor consumers and are able to reach them, they might
not be able to do so in an economical way. The cost of
conducting market research on such consumers, developing
a solution to meet their needs, and delivering this solution to
remote locations might be higher than the likely returns from
such exchanges. Going back to eye care in India, the World
Bank estimates that over $200 million is needed yearly to
expand and build eye care infrastructure to the required level.
Even large multinationals often do not have the financial re-
sources needed to reach out to poor consumers in a financially
viable manner (see Chaudhary et al. 2012; Rangan 2009;
Karamchandani et al. 2009).
Taken together, the relative lack of institutions that enable
exchange with poor consumers in emerging markets is likely
to mean that sellers are frequently unable or unwilling to enter
into such exchanges, resulting in market failure.
Business model innovation in emerging markets
Given the significant barriers to exchange that exist on both the
demand and supply sides of the buyer-seller dyad, the question
then arises as to how, if at all, exchanges involving poor con-
sumers in emerging markets might be facilitated. How, for in-
stance, might a persistent firm or entrepreneur overcome such
barriers to enable these exchanges to occur? We argue that initi-
ating and fulfilling exchanges with poor consumers in emerging
markets requires business model innovation, namely finding a
way to deliver an attractive value proposition to poor consumers
in a financially viable and sustainablemanner (see Prahalad 2010;
Anderson and Markides 2007; Anderson et al. 2010). We now
discuss examples of companies that corrected market failures in
emerging markets through business model innovation (see
Table 3 for a summary of all business model innovations
discussed in the paper).
Business model innovation to address market failure due
to affordability
Aravind Eye Hospitals offer an example of business model inno-
vation focused on addressing the challenge of preventable blind-
ness in India (see Prahalad 2010). The key obstacle that the foun-
der of the hospital network, Dr. Govindappa Venkataswamy,
faced was the high cost of starting and operating such hospitals,
which in turn made them unaffordable to most consumers. To
overcome these obstacles Dr. Venkataswamy reinvented the cat-
aract surgery business model. Instead of using a cost-based ap-
proach to pricing, he set the price of his service based on the
economic stratum of the community he served: those who could
afford the full price, paid it; those who couldn’t, got the service at
a reduced rate or even free. He thenworked backwards fromwhat
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Table 3 Business Model Innovation in Emerging Markets
Company Industry Country Type of Market Failure Business Model Innovation
Dial 1298 Healthcare India Demand side – lack of accessibility
Demand side – poor consumers cannot
afford private reliable ambulance
service
Demand side – lack of awareness
Supply side – government’s lack of
economic means to provide
ambulance services for everyone
Value for customer:
High-quality, efficient, reliable ambulance
service provider for all; single universal
access number. Affordable pricing model;
awareness campaigns in Mumbai’s slums.
Financially viable for the company:
Tiered pricing structure based on the patient’s
ability to pay: if the patient requests to go to
a public hospital they pay 50% of the
standard price; accident victims are
transported for free.
Community based advertisements to
overcome misperceptions, additional
revenues from advertisements on their
vehicles.
Aravind Eye
Hospital
Healthcare India Demand side – lack of accessibility
Demand side – consumers cannot
afford expensive eye operations
Supply side – governments lack the
economic means to treat poor
patients for free; lack of social
support policy
Supply side – reaching poor consumers
Value for customers: The level and quality of
service received by paying versus
non-paying customers is the same.
Financially viable for the company:
Reducing fixed cost through reproducibility
(standardized process to reduce the core
skills necessary andminimize discretionary
elements; focus on eye cataract surgery).
Price is set based on what the community
can afford to pay and the hospital then
works backwards to contain the costs.
➔ Key innovation: Adopting the assembly
line approach to cataract surgery.
Safaricom –
M-PESA
Banking -
Remittances
Kenya Demand side – Lack of trust in banks
Demand side – lack of access to
reliable remittance service
Demand side – only available
alternative was not affordable
Supply side – reaching poor consumers
Supply side – lack of economic means
Value for customer: Affordable, accessible
and safe mode of transferring money.
Financially viable for the company:
Increased revenues from sale of airtime;
increased market share; building strong
customer loyalty. Reduced cost by using a
vast network of independent agents,
capitalizing on big data in guaranteeing a
sustained cash flow to the agents. Raised
50% of the capital investment needed
through a grant from DFID.
M-KOPA Electricity Kenya, Tanzania,
Uganda
Demand side – lack of access to
electricity grid
Demand side – lack of affordability
Supply side – reaching poor consumers
Supply side – lack of economic means
to fulfil exchange
Value for customer: Solar leasing product,
using mobile money. Access to electricity,
not only for lightning, but for other devices
as well. The technology helps customers
build a credit history.
Instead of customers bearing high upfront
investment, M-Kopa requires a relatively
small down payment ($34) and the rest of
the cost will be paid off through daily in-
stalments at a 20% interest rate (i.e.
M-Kopa does not only offer solar lighting
solutions, but also offers a finance solution
that makes the product affordable).
Financially viable for the company:
M-Kopa saves a lot by using M-PESA as the
payment system for instalments. The
M-PESA sim-card acts as a loan officer in
the sense that it can automatically switch
off electricity if the instalment payment was
not made on time.
Daily instalments initially priced close to the
price of Kerosene, with the prospect of
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people could pay to focus on ways of reducing the cost structure
to fit the average price.
To reduce the cost structure, he focused on one main type
of surgery, namely cataract surgery: the main cause of blind-
ness in India. This allowed him to focus on reducing fixed
costs through reproducibility (i.e. standardizing the process
to reduce the core skills and discretionary elements needed).
This in turn allowed him to reduce surgery time from 30 min
to 10 min. Further, he found ways to ensure that the level and
quality of surgery received by paying versus non-paying cus-
tomers was the same. For instance, by having doctors rotate
between paying and non-paying wards, he ensured that the
quality of surgery did not vary across patients. Aravind’s busi-
ness model innovation can therefore be summarized as: 1) the
adoption of the assembly line approach (i.e. high volumes,
low margins) to cataract surgery and 2) pricing the service
Table 3 (continued)
Company Industry Country Type of Market Failure Business Model Innovation
customers not having to pay in the future
once they have paid off their debt.
➔ Key Innovation: capitalizing on the
availability of mobile money for paying
daily instalments to access electricity.
CEMEX Cement Mexico, Colombia,
Nicaragua and
Costa Rica
Demand side – lack of affordability
Supply side – unaware of customer
needs
Supply side – reaching poor consumers
Value for customers:
Families participating in the scheme receive
technical support and building material.
Families have access to different financing
plans, ranging from savings to
micro-credit, depending on their needs.
The cost of materials is fixed for the duration
of the work, protecting customers from
price fluctuations and other
macroeconomic instability.
CEMEX also provides storage of and
vouchers for materials, should customers
run into periods of inconsistent
employment or wish to delay construction.
Financially viable to the company:
Income generation: service fees, demand
expansion, increased brand loyalty and
brand value.
Cost reduction: discounts from participating
distributors.
Unilever – Project
Shakti
FMCG India Demand side – lack of accessibility
Demand side – lack of affordability
Supply side – reaching poor consumers
Supply side – lack of economic means
to fulfil exchange
Value for customers:While most of the
literature focuses on the opportunity
created for the Shakti-entrepreneur, one
could argue that the value for customers is
access to affordable high quality consumer
goods. However, this argument has faced
substantial opposition and several scholars
have argued against how FMCGs make
their products affordable to poor
consumers.
Financially viable for the company:
Unilever drove down the cost of long
supply chains by providing female
entrepreneurs with access to micro-credit to
purchase Unilever products and sell them
in their villages. This is argued to be a
win-win solution since project Shakti offers
women from the local villages an employ-
ment opportunity that generates income for
them and their family and at the same time
drives down the cost of long supply chains
for Unilever.
Sources: Chandy andDuke (2011); Segel et al. (2006); Rangan andRajan (2007); Rangan (2009); Prahalad (2010); Johar andHarries (2010); Chaudhary
et al. (2012); Aglionby (2016); Crainer (2013); London and Kotek (2006); London et al. (2012)
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based on the economic stratum of the consumer. Finally, it is
worth noting that the market failure in this example, caused by
the lack of government resources, has been solved through
business model innovation on the part of a private enterprise.
Business model innovation to address market failure due
to lack of awareness
As previously noted, 34% of Mexico’s population faces a hous-
ing deficit. Homes for this large section of the population are
often either incomplete or poorly built. CEMEX, Mexico’s big-
gest producer of buildingmaterial, realized that the people affect-
ed by this housing deficit were end users of CEMEX products,
and yet the company knew almost nothing about them. To ad-
dress this issue, CEMEX issued a BDeclaration of Ignorance^ to
publicly acknowledge their limited knowledge and to initiate
actions to remedy the problem. In 1998, CEMEX launched an
initiative called Patrimony Hoy (BPersonal Property Today^ in
Spanish) which began by conducting extensive market research
to better understand customer behaviors and needs (see Segel
et al. 2006; London and Lee 2006; London et al. 2012).
There were two key findings of this research. First, poor
consumers often just lack the financial means to access adequate
buildingmaterial. Second, evenwhen poor families were able to
afford some of the building materials needed, they often faced
unexpected financial hardship that forced them to halt the build-
ing process, leading to degradation and waste of the purchased
materials due to lack of adequate storage facilities.
In response to the first finding, CEMEX innovated and
changed their business model to better serve and meet the
needs of their poor customers. They developed a product that
gave poor families direct access to building materials as well
as technical support. They also gave families access to differ-
ent financing plans, ranging from micro-credit to micro-sav-
ing, based on their needs and income. In response to the sec-
ond finding, CEMEX also offered families access to storage
facilities, in case they ran into financial difficulties and needed
to pause the project for a period of time.
In order to make the business model financially viable,
CEMEX had to think about sustainable revenue streams and cost
reduction mechanisms. The company’s sustainable revenue
stream came from the service fees they charged the customer,
which were often covered by the different financing schemes
offered to the customer. In order to drive down costs CEMEX
had to negotiate new deals with distributers participating in the
program (see Segel et al. 2006; London and Lee 2006; London
et al. 2012).
Business model innovation to address market failure due
to the inaccessibility of poor consumers
Over 70% of consumers in India live in villages dispersed all
over the country. Given the poor transportation infrastructure
in India, reaching these consumers is not only costly but also
difficult using traditional supply chain structures. To address
this challenge, Unilever India developed a new business mod-
el titled Project Shakti. The project focused on driving down
the cost of long, complex supply chains, by providing female
entrepreneurs in rural India with access to micro-credit that
they could use to purchase Unilever products to sell in their
villages. This project not only reduced the cost of reaching
poor consumers in rural villages, it also created employment
for thousands of Shakti entrepreneurs whose income was dou-
bled as a result. The key challenge in making this business
model work was pricing the products at a level that guaranteed
a high enough margin to keep the Shakti entrepreneurs moti-
vated, while at the same time not causing conflict with other
channel members (see Rangan and Rajan 2007).
While finding a viable business model is crucial, equally
important is implementing the business model to facilitate and
maintain exchange over the long term (Anderson and
Markides 2007; Anderson et al. 2010). Because of the
fragmented nature of the institutional environment, however,
implementing new business models in emerging markets is
likely to require institutional entrepreneurship – the purposive
reshaping of existing institutions or the creation of new ones –
on the part of sellers. Specifically, to create and facilitate ex-
change in emerging economies, marketers need to work with
the existing institutional context to forge a set of institutional
arrangements that allows them to deliver a value proposition
in a financially viable and sustainable manner. We now turn to
a detailed discussion of the role of institutional entrepreneur-
ship in facilitating the implementation of business model in-
novation, and hence exchange, in the context of marketing to
the poor in emerging economies.
Exchange in emerging markets: an institutional
perspective
In this section we start by drawing on organization theory
to build a set of institutional arguments (see Dacin et al.
2002; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Greenwood et al. 2008)
designed to explain how sellers introduce fundamentally new
business models in an emerging market context. We then in-
troduce in turn the three phases of our proposed institutional
model of exchange (see Fig. 2), with reference to a variety of
examples, to show how businesses have engaged in institu-
tional entrepreneurship in order to implement business model
innovations that addressed or fixed a market failure of the
emerging market in which the firm was operating (see
Table 4 for a summary of all examples). And finally, we use
the example of solar lighting solutions to provide a compre-
hensive illustration of how our institutional model of ex-
change functions in practice.
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Implementing business model innovation: an institutional
perspective
Institutional theory was originally concerned with the ways in
which institutions constrain behavior and promote organiza-
tional conformity to dominant norms and practices. Over the
last two decades, however, institutional analysis has become
increasingly concerned with explaining institutional change,
with a particular focus on the role of firms and other actors in
manipulating the institutional context in which they operate
(e.g., Garud et al. 2002; Greenwood and Hinings 1996;
Hargadon and Douglas 2001).
The notion of institutional entrepreneurship – the
Bactivities of actors who leverage resources to create new
institutions or to transform existing ones^ (Maguire et al.
2004 p. 657) – has had an especially significant impact on
the institutional literature, providing a powerful conceptual
tool for researchers seeking to understand the role of strategic
choice in institutional change. Institutional entrepreneurs
might be individuals (Tracey et al. 2010), firms and other
types of organization (Garud et al. 2002), or groups of indi-
viduals and/or organizations such as social movements (Hiatt
et al. 2009). The key issue, however, is that these actors have a
set of strategic objectives that they seek to achieve by altering
the institutional arrangements in which they are embedded.
The term institutional work is used to describe the particular
strategies institutional entrepreneurs use when seeking to cre-
ate, maintain or disrupt existing institutional arrangements in
order to achieve a particular objective (Lawrence and Suddaby
2006).
These theoretical developments have underpinned the
emergence of a significant body of research designed to ex-
plain how firms are able to influence their environments and
engage in innovation. In this paper, we adapt this work to
explain how sellers implement business model innovation in
emerging markets in order to create and maintain formal ex-
changes with the poor. Our basic argument is that sellers need
to operate in an institutional context that enables them to de-
liver a value proposition in a financially viable and sustainable
manner. However, given the nature of emerging markets
outlined above, sellers may be unable to do so within existing
institutional configurations. This means that to innovate in this
context sellers may have to engage in deliberate action de-
signed to strategically engender changes in their institutional
environment. In other words, a ‘solution’ to the problems of
poorly functioningmarkets in emerging economies may be for
sellers to act as institutional entrepreneurs.
We develop a model (see Process of Institutional Change in
Fig. 2) that builds on prior work from institutional theory in its
interface with the technology management literature (see Van
de Ven and Garud 1993; Van de Ven et al. 1999, 2000a, b;
Garud et al. 2003; Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006). Drawing
on a key part of this body of work (Hargrave and Van de Ven
2006), our model comprises four institutional change process-
es – which we consider as four distinct types of institutional
work – that institutional entrepreneurs need to engage in to
affect institutional change. (1) Framing: frames are shared
interpretive schemes or systems of meaning that help actors
make sense of the world and provide templates for organizing
(McAdam et al. 1996), (2) network construction, which is a
political process characterized by competition and co-
operation between the relevant actors in a given institutional
setting (see Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006). (3) enactment of
institutional arrangements, which entails working with pow-
erful state and other regulatory actors in order to create or
enact the formal and informal institutions necessary for a giv-
en business model innovation to become viable, and (4) legit-
imation through collective action processes, where legitima-
tion involves proving that the business model works by get-
ting consumers and other stakeholders committed to the new
form of exchange and ensuring that the resources needed to
sustain the model continue to flow toward it.
An institutional model of exchange in emerging markets
We will now introduce our institutional model of exchange
(see Fig. 2) in which we argue that the process of creating and
maintaining exchanges with poor consumers in emerging
Framing NetworkConstrucon Enactment
Legit-
imaon
Sellers Buyers Sellers Buyers
Phase 1:
Market Failure
Phase 2:
Process of Instuonal Change
Phase 3:
Exchange
Fig. 2 An Institutional Model of Exchange in Emerging Markets
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markets unfolds in three phases. In phase 1 buyers and sellers
operate in a situation of market failure in which exchange is
inefficient, partial or non-existent. In phase 2 sellers imple-
ment the four steps discussed above (framing, network con-
struction, enactment of institutional arrangements and legiti-
mation through collective action) to implement their business
model by working to bring about the institutional change
needed to support it. And finally phase three is a result of
the successful implementation of the proposed business model
which leads to buyers and sellers operating in a situation in
which formal exchange occurs and a formal market exists. We
will now discuss each of the three phases in more detail with
examples illustrating the theoretical concept.
In phase 1, buyers and sellers operate in a situation of
market failure in which exchange is inefficient, partial or
non-existent. This is largely because the institutions needed
to facilitate exchange are non-existent or fragmentary. To cre-
ate the conditions for exchange, sellers need to develop a
business model that delivers value for buyers in a financially
viable and sustainable way.
Take Kenya’s banking and remittance industry as an exam-
ple. In 2006, the industry was characterized by market failure
leading to insufficient exchange: 74% of the population was
unbanked and 85% of the population was sending remittances
using informal and unsafe methods (for instance, a commonly
used method was sending cash with friends, family or even
complete strangers such as bus drivers). This led to a number
of problems: money would not be delivered on time, or bus
drivers might charge extensive fees for the transfer, or the
money would get lost on the way without the sender or receiv-
er having any way of holding the courier to account. The only
safe alternative available at that time was Western Union,
which used to charge up to 40% transfer fees, making this
service expensive and unaffordable.
To address and fix the market failure and to create a better
environment for exchange, Nick Hughes, head of Global
Payment Solutions at Vodafone, developed M-PESA (M- for
mobile and Pesa being Swahili for money): a service that
allowed customers of Safaricom (Vodafone’s subsidiary in
Kenya) to deposit and transfer money using their mobile
phones. The value delivered to customers was that the service
offers an affordable, safe and accessible mode of money trans-
fer and remittance. The service also proved to be economically
viable: it increased the company’s market share and revenues
and built strong customer loyalty. Further, Hughes was able to
reduce cost by 1) using a vast network of independent agents
(often Bmom and pop^ retailers) to cash the money, 2) using
big data to guarantee a sustained cash flow to the agents’
network and 3) raising 50% of the initial capital investment
needed from DFID (Britain’s aid agency) (see Chandy and
Duke 2011; Jack and Suri 2014; Sadoulet and Furdelle 2014).
In Phase 2, sellers implement the business model by work-
ing to bring about the institutional change needed to support it.
This process requires sellers to frame the problem and solution
appropriately; construct networks that facilitate the implemen-
tation of the business model; enact institutional arrangements to
put in place the regulations, resources, demand and proprietary
activities needed to support the business model; and achieve
legitimacy for the business model to ensure that it is sustainable
in the long run. We now discuss the specific steps that institu-
tional entrepreneurs like Nick Hughes go through to implement
and guarantee the success of their business model innovation.
Phase 2: step 1: framing
The first type of institutional work that sellers in emerging
markets need to engage in when seeking to implement inno-
vative business models is framing. Frames are shared interpre-
tive schemes – or systems of meaning – that help actors make
sense of the world and provide templates for organizing
(McAdam et al. 1996). Stable institutional contexts are char-
acterized by dominant collective action frames, which are tak-
en for granted by the constituent actors in that context.
However, institutional entrepreneurs can challenge dominant
frames through the development of strategically constructed
alternatives. This involves institutional entrepreneurs critiqu-
ing current institutional arrangements and specifying their
shortcomings, then proposing an alternative set of arrange-
ments that challenge these shortcomings.
For example, the entrepreneurial firm trying to sell solar
lighting solutions to the rural poor in India (see Miller 2009)
first had to challenge a dominant frame which assumed that
the lighting needs of those off the electricity grid could only be
met by the state or aid agencies investing large amounts of
money in expanding the central grid. This firm then needed to
propose an alternative arrangement that involved small-scale,
decentralized solutions such as those involving solar technol-
ogy, i.e. a new business model. Further, while the selling of
solar technologies in developed economies typically involves
an appeal to sustainability and Bgreen^ agendas, the entrepre-
neurial firm in India found such framing to be less effective in
the context of its target market. Instead, the firm found that its
discourse had to be primarily centered on the fundamental
need for affordable lighting solutions and only secondarily
about the sustainability benefits of solar technology (see
Miller 2009).
Institutional entrepreneurs need to engage in three main
framing tasks when seeking to alter a particular system of
meaning (Benford and Snow 2000). The first task is diagnos-
tic framing, which involves the articulation of a particular
problem and an attempt to identify the causes of that problem.
In the context of selling solar lighting to the rural poor in India,
this required the entrepreneur to identify and highlight the
huge unmet need that those off the electricity grid have for
affordable lighting, along with the fact that expanding the grid
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to reach 600,000 Indian villages was not a viable solution,
even over the medium to long term (Miller 2009).
The second task is prognostic framing, which involves ar-
ticulating a potential solution to the problem that has been
identified, and proposing a specific strategy or set of strategies
for how the solution might be implemented. There is clearly a
close relationship between diagnostic and prognostic framing;
thus Bthe identification of specific problems and causes tends
to constrain the possible ‘reasonable’ solutions and strategies
advocated^ (Benford and Snow 2000, p. 616). In the context
of selling solar lighting to the rural poor in India, prognostic
framing meant that the entrepreneurial firm had to propose a
solution built around a de-centralized strategy in which house-
holds off the grid are able to generate their own power rather
than rely on expensive and unlikely outcomes such as the
expansion of the electricity grid (Miller 2009). Identifying
the unworkable nature of a centralized solution (expanding
the electricity grid through large government investment) at
least partially enabled the entrepreneurial firm to come up
with a decentralized solution to the problem.
The third core framing task is motivational framing. This
provides the rationale or justification for a particular course of
action through which institutional entrepreneurs can galvanize
support and convince others to commit time and effort toward
a particular goal. Here the outline of a clear mission combined
with a workable business model become crucial. Again, in
the case of selling solar lighting solutions, the company
selling the solution made it its mission to prove 1) that poor
people could afford sustainable technology and 2) that the
company could make a profit from selling such technology
to the poor (Miller 2009).
Nick Hughes used diagnostic, prognostic and motiva-
tional framing to convince the top management of
Vodafone’s HQ in the UK to invest approximately $3
million into M-PESA. VF’s management had two main
objections to the mobile money solution: 1) M-PESA
was too far from Vodafone’s core business (i.e., voice
and data) and 2) VF’s top management wanted to see
return on investment in the short run to justify the high
initial capital investment required. Both objections are
typical of a firm like Vodafone that is accountable to
a large number of stakeholders and needs to justify to
them any risk that the company is taking. However, this
mindset and way of operating was the biggest obstacle
in the way of M-PESA and could have killed the idea
very early on.
Despite this, Nick Hughes decided to continue to pursue
his idea and change the institutional arrangements standing in
his way. Instead of depending onVodafone to finance 100% of
the project, Hughes legitimized his idea by securing 50% of
the required funding from DFID (the UK’s international aid
agency) and asking Vodafone to match this funding. DFID as
an institution operates with a different mindset: because they
have a better understanding of emerging markets, they under-
stand the time it might take for such a project to be implement-
ed and show a return on investment.
Securing the DFID funding helped Hughes with diagnostic
framing in the sense that it showed Vodafone’s top manage-
ment that Hughes’ articulation of the problem was accurate,
that the idea was promising and that the problem lay in their
short term focus. It also helped in prognostic framing in the
sense that securing the DFID funding solved half the problem
and showed Vodafone that the M-PESA idea was legitimate.
This in turn motivated Vodafone’s top management to agree to
fund the remaining 50% of the project and to give Nick
Hughes more time to show results. At the time, Nick
Hughes was a pioneer in looking for funding from an aid
agency for the implementation of a new business idea (see
Chandy and Duke 2011; Jack and Suri 2014; Sadoulet and
Furdelle 2014).
Phase 2: step 2: network construction
The second type of institutional work that sellers must per-
form when implementing business model innovation in
emerging markets is network construction. Most studies of
institutional entrepreneurship show that it is a political process
characterized by competition and co-operation between the
relevant actors in a given institutional setting (see Hargrave
and Van de Ven 2006). For example, Levy and Scully (2007,
p. 985) describe institutional entrepreneurs as BModern
Princes^ who use their skills to create networks in order to
Boutmanoeuvre dominant actors with superior resources^.
Similarly, Wijen and Ansari (2007) note that institutional en-
trepreneurship poses a Bcollective action problem^ in which
actors need to balance their own individual interests with co-
operation, while at the same time guarding against actors who
seek to free-ride on the efforts of others.
While some studies have focused on institutional entrepre-
neurs with obviously dominant positions (e.g. Hoffman
1999), others have focused on the ways in which actors with
apparently marginal positions have helped to shape new insti-
tutional configurations (e.g. Hensmans 2003; Maguire et al.
2004). Regardless of their relative power and the nature of
their resources, however, all institutional entrepreneurs are
required to construct strategic networks to achieve their
objectives.
The role of networks is particularly significant in the con-
text of exchange with the poor in emerging markets
(Anderson and Markides 2007; Anderson et al. 2010). The
absence of existing institutions that facilitate distribution and
after sales service, as well as the lack of institutions that ensure
consumer education and protection, mean that sellers in these
markets must develop an ecosystem of partners to help make
their products and services accessible and acceptable to con-
sumers (see Mahajan 2008; Mahajan and Banga 2006). Given
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the remoteness of these consumers, it is often the case that
marginal rather than dominant actors have a major role to play
in the creation and functioning of these networks. The impor-
tance of networks holds for a range of industries, including
fast moving consumer goods, cellular phones and financial
services.
In financial services, many different forms of microfinance
have involved the creation of a network of self-help groups
(Yunus et al. 2010). Each self-help group is itself a network of
like-minded women without access to credit who pool their
resources to invest, lend to and borrow from each other.
Moreover, fast moving consumer goods manufacturers like
Unilever now engage with networks of such self-help groups
to distribute their products to remote consumers in an efficient
and cost effective way (see Rangan and Rajan 2007). Indeed,
working with microfinance institutions provides Unilever
with access to self-help groups and their members. Under such
arrangements, individual members of self-help groups may
take loans from their group to buy material from Unilever
which they then sell on to consumers in their local communi-
ties, thus acting as semi-formal members of a Unilever Bretail^
network. Finally, cellular phone service providers in emerging
markets, such as Safaricom in Kenya or Bharti Airtel in India,
have over time worked with a large number of Bmom-and-
pop^ retailers to create a vast retail network that serves con-
sumers in far-flung rural communities (see Prahalad and
Mashelkar 2010). The successful adoption of mobile telepho-
ny in emerging markets has been largely a consequence of the
development and use of such distribution networks.
Phase 2: step 3: enactment of institutional arrangements
Sellers often need to work with powerful state and other regu-
latory actors in order to create or enact the formal and informal
institutions necessary for a given business model innovation to
become viable. This may involve deliberately creating conflict
between existing institutional structures and processes.
The institutional infrastructure needed for creating and
implementing innovation typically comprises four building
blocks (see Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006; Van de Ven and
Garud 1993; Van de Ven et al. 1999). The first is institutional
regulations. These are the rules created by the government
agencies, trade bodies and technical communities that regulate
a given product or technology, whose approval is required for
its introduction. These actors must be persuaded to support the
innovation and put the necessary formal institutional arrange-
ments in place if it is to be viable. For instance, in selling
financial services to the unbanked poor in emerging markets,
a key challenge for sellers has been influencing central banks
such as the Reserve Bank of India or Central Bank of Kenya to
enable non-banking entities such as cellular phone operators
to provide financial services like mobile payments without
using the intermediation of banks (see The Economic Times
2008).
Often, the approval and support of these regulatory bodies
is what makes or breaks a business model in an emerging
market. To illustrate the importance of such institutional reg-
ulations, consider two emerging markets, Kenya and Egypt,
where regulatory arrangements made all the difference for the
success of mobile payment services. After a short but intense
battle with the Central Bank of Kenya, Safaricom managed to
gain their support and approval for the launch of M-PESA in
2007. The Central Bank of Kenya interfered very little in
determining the number of agents allowed to work for M-
PESA, as long as certain security measures such as Bknow-
your-customer^ conditions were guaranteed. The vast net-
work of agents enabled by this approach was a key factor in
the success ofM-PESA in Kenya. In Egypt, on the other hand,
the regulator capped the number of agents allowed per mobile
operator at 2000, with very strict criteria governing who could
be an agent; this in turn led to a concentration of agents in
Egypt’s main cities, severely limiting the spread and success
of the service (see Chandy and Duke 2011; Jack and Suri
2014; Sadoulet and Furdelle 2014).
The second building block is resource endowments, which
comprise the basic knowledge required to develop the product
and the pool of human resources needed for the business model
to function effectively, as well as the appropriate financial
mechanisms required to fund the development costs of the
new business model. For instance, selling financial services to
the unbanked poor in Bangladesh required the Grameen Bank
to select and train service personnel to promote, distribute and
serve a dispersed and relatively uneducated customer base
(Yunus et al. 2010). It also required the Grameen Bank to work
with investors to secure the finances needed to put such oper-
ations in place (Yunus et al. 2010). Given the relatively untested
nature of such markets, securing these resources can be a par-
ticularly difficult and drawn out process (see Miller 2009).
In the case of M-PESA, one of the challenges that Nick
Hughes faced with his new business model was a cash-flow
bottleneck. Hughes realized that the flow of remittances was
for the most part from urban to rural Kenya, which meant that
the agents in urban areas had a cash surplus, while agents in
rural areas suffered from a cash deficit. Leveraging his oper-
ations background, Hughes developed a sophisticated net-
work of cash distribution between agents according to their
needs and location. This step was essential in securing the
necessary resources to guarantee the smooth running and suc-
cess of the business model (see Chandy and Duke 2011).
The third building block is consumer demand, which for
Bnew to the world^ business models does not pre-exist; insti-
tutional entrepreneurs are required to raise awareness and
stimulate demand for their products. In the case of introducing
banking to the unbanked, convincing poor consumers – who
earn and spend on a daily basis – of the benefits of saving and
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of paying a monthly fee for the privilege of doing so, is not a
trivial exercise (Dupas and Robinson 2010). Educating these
consumers and changing their existing patterns of behavior to
create the necessary demand requires strategic action on the
part of entrepreneurial actors and involves considerable re-
sources, time and effort.
The fourth building block is proprietary activities which
allow institutional entrepreneurs to capture value and create a
commercially viable venture through business model innova-
tion. Particularly important in this respect is the creation of
complementary assets such as manufacturing, marketing and
distribution. Again, in the context of bringing financial ser-
vices to the unbanked poor, once sellers have persuaded these
consumers to open a bank account, they then face the signif-
icant challenge of deepening consumers’ use of financial ser-
vices. Enabling such consumers to ascend the financial ladder
and move from savings to more sophisticated financial instru-
ments such as loans and insurance after initial adoption re-
quires a great deal of organization, effort and resources
(Yunus et al. 2010). For example, it requires a salesforce that
manages relationships with customers, constantly encourag-
ing them to extend their existing custom while also cross-
selling new services to them.
Phase 2: step 4: legitimation through collective action
processes
Having framed the ‘problem’ and proposed a possible ‘solu-
tion’ in the form of a new business model, constructed a net-
work to lobby in favor of that solution, and enacted an appro-
priate set of formal and informal institutional structures within
a given emerging market to support it, the final type of insti-
tutional work required of sellers is the legitimation of the new
business model through collective action. Thus while framing,
network construction and institutional enactment lay the
groundwork for the actual implementation of the business
model, legitimation helps secure the long term sustainability
of the model. Specifically, legitimation involves proving that
the business model works by getting consumers and other
stakeholders committed to the new form of exchange and
ensuring that the resources needed to sustain the model con-
tinue to flow toward it.
Legitimacy is a foundational concept in institutional theory.
While researchers have identified many different kinds of le-
gitimacy, we focus on two core types: namely cognitive and
sociopolitical legitimacy (see Aldrich and Fiol 1994).
Cognitive legitimacy refers to the level of public knowledge
about a new product, service or process. When actors in a
given institutional context accept an activity as ‘taken for
granted’ and no longer question its existence, the activity is
said to have high levels of cognitive legitimacy. In the context
of microfinance, for instance, once the basic model was shown
by the Grameen bank to work in Bangladesh, terms such as
micro-credit, self-help group, and Grameen entered the vocab-
ulary of policymakers and investors worldwide (see Pearl and
Phillips 2001).
Sociopolitical legitimacy refers to the extent to which key
actors such as government officials and legislators, public fig-
ures, opinion leaders and the media openly endorse and sup-
port a new product, service or process. In the context of
microfinance, if it began to achieve sociopolitical legitimacy
when the World Bank and venture capitalists started to invest
large sums on such schemes worldwide (see Pearl and Phillips
2001), then this process reached its apotheosis when
Mohammed Yunus and Grameen Bank were awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize in 2006. Cognitive and sociopolitical legit-
imacy are clearly closely related: institutional entrepre-
neurs need to build levels of public knowledge and then
gain the support of powerful actors if they are to become
legitimate and thus highly institutionalized. With respect to
microfinance, this symbiotic relationship between the two
types of legitimacy has clearly existed from the start; for in-
stance, the interest and behavior of investors and policymakers
have clearly influenced the opinions of the media and general
public, and vice versa.
Legitimacy is closely linked to various positive performance
outcomes (Bansal and Clelland 2004; Cohen and Dean 2005;
Hannan and Carroll 1992; Pollock and Rindova 2003).
Specifically, legitimacy has been shown to improve the likeli-
hood of organizational survival and resource acquisition (Stuart
et al. 1999). In the context of microfinance, the bank that Yunus
started in 1976 by lending $27 to a group of families in a village
has now become a billion-dollar micro-credit venture with
more than eight million borrowers in Bangladesh alone.
In the case of M-PESA the service gained cognitive legit-
imacy 12 months after its launch when its active subscriber
numbers increased by 30.6%, its subscriber market share was
estimated at 79% and revenue market share was estimated at
83%. Additionally, the service spread beyond Kenya’s bound-
aries: other mobile operators invested and tried to implement
the service in countries like Tanzania, Uganda and
Afghanistan (see Chandy and Duke 2011; Jack and Suri
2014; Sadoulet and Furdelle 2014). Yet, the success of M-
PESA in Kenya was unprecedented. Replications often failed
due to barriers in implementing one or more of the 4 steps of
the institutional model of exchange described above (e.g.,
enacting institutional arrangements in Egypt).
M-PESA gained a clear form of socio-political legitimacy
once whole new business models started to be based on the
service, as when micro-finance institutions started to integrate
mobile payments into their business models in order to reduce
the costs of collecting payments (Jack and Suri 2014; Sadoulet
and Furdelle 2014). Nick Hughes himself subsequently
founded M-Kopa, a provider of solar lighting solutions in
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The business model of M-
Kopa is only possible because it leverages mobile payments
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to enable unbanked customers to pay off the up-front costs of
solar lighting equipment using micropayments in instalments.
Finally, in Phase 3, buyers and sellers operate in a situation
in which formal exchange occurs and a formal market exists.
Buyers are aware of the seller’s offering and are able to afford
and access it, while sellers are able to deliver the offering in a
financially sustainable manner, thus ensuring that the condi-
tions for exchange to happen are met.
Overall, the example ofM-PESA in Kenya allows us to see
in detail how an institutional entrepreneur like Nick Hughes
might navigate the four stages of our proposed institutional
model of exchange, altering the realities he initially faced,
which were often obstacles in his way. Hughes successfully
managed to turn around the remittance industry in Kenya from
a market failure to a market success, while at the same time
changing the nature and business model of the telecom indus-
try more generally.
Our proposed institutional model of exchange in emerging
markets can help organizations devise and implement success-
ful business model innovations to tackle some of the most
pressing market failures faced by our societies today. In order
to demonstrate the practical and theoretical insights that the
model affords – which have been suggested by the examples
threaded through the foregoing discussion – the next section
examines one case in depth: how a solar lighting company in
India brought about change and gave thousands of households
access to clean energy (see Miller 2009).
An illustration of the institutional model of exchange:
the case of solar lighting
In order to provide a more comprehensive illustration of our
proposedModel (see Fig. 2), consider again the case of selling
solar lighting solutions to the rural poor in India (see Miller
2009). In the mid-1990s (Phase 1), the market for such solu-
tions did not exist despite a large unmet need: while large
numbers of poor consumers were off the electricity grid, for-
mal exchanges for alternative energy solutions were rare if not
nonexistent. On the buyer side, three major factors accounted
for this market failure: lack of affordability, availability and
awareness. On the seller side, the major reason for market
failure was the challenge of delivering an affordable and ac-
cessible solar lighting solution in a financially viable and sus-
tainable way.
The first step for the seller wishing to create such a market
was to develop a business model that found a way around
these obstacles to exchange. A potential business model that
would achieve this involved creating a network of local
entrepreneur-distributors who would use a bank loan guaran-
teed by the seller to buy the solar equipment and batteries;
these local entrepreneurs would use the equipment to charge
the batteries which would then be rented on a daily basis to
end consumers. With such a model, the local entrepreneurs
absorbed the capital cost of the equipment and made the so-
lution affordable to end consumers, most of whom earned and
spent money on a daily basis. The local presence of these
entrepreneurs also ensured that the solution was available
and accessible to end consumers, and provided an opportunity
to increase awareness.
While elegant as a potential solution, actually implementing
this business model was a far greater challenge because the
institutions needed for its implementation were fragmentary
or nonexistent. Thus, in Phase 2 (1995–2005), the seller had
to do a great deal of institutional work to shape the institutions
needed to implement the business model and to create and
facilitate exchange. First, the seller had to frame the challenge
and the proposed solution. This involved making the case to
relevant stakeholders that the energy needs of those off the
electricity grid could not be achieved by existing centralized,
on-grid solutions, but would instead require decentralized, off-
grid solutions involving new technologies such as solar.
Framing also involved outlining a business model, like the
one above, that would make such a solution possible in a fi-
nancially sustainable way.
Second, implementing the business model required work-
ing to create the necessary networks needed to make the busi-
ness model viable. The major step here was selecting, training
and financing a network of local entrepreneurs who would act
as intermediaries between the seller and end consumers. As
described above, the proper selection, training and financing
of these entrepreneurs ensured the affordability, accessibility
and awareness needed to make the business model work.
Third, implementing the business model required a process
of institutional enactment whereby the seller could secure the
resources and formal contracts needed to finance the business
model and make it financially sustainable. This in turn re-
quired working with banks to convince them to lend money
to people (micro-entrepreneurs) who lacked a credit history in
a sector in which the banks lacked prior investment experience
(i.e. energy and solar technologies).
Finally, implementing the business model required gaining
legitimacy among important stakeholders such as investors,
government officials, public figures and opinion leaders.
Achieving such legitimacy in turn required sustained interac-
tion, negotiation and communication with these stakeholders
to not only ensure that the business model was successfully
implemented but also to ensure that this success was recog-
nized and celebrated in various quarters.
Phase 2, namely the process of institutional work needed to
implement the business model in this context, was difficult
and time consuming and took over 10 years of sustained effort
to realize. It was only after this process was completed that the
market entered Phase 3. Specifically, it was only around 2005
that the conditions needed for a large number of formal ex-
changes to take place in this sector were finally met and a
proper market came into existence for solar lighting solutions
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for the rural poor. Indeed, by 2005–2006 the seller had
installed more than 100,000 solar lighting systems and gener-
ated sales of $3 million despite the fact that two-thirds of the
firm’s customers lived on less than $4 per day. Moreover, a
number of other players had entered the market, further estab-
lishing the legitimacy of the sector and ensuring its viability in
the long run (Miller 2009).
Discussion and conclusion
We have developed a model designed specifically to under-
stand exchange with poor consumers in emerging economies.
To do so, we have integrated institutional theory with research
in marketing and innovation to conceptualize sellers to the
poor in emerging markets as institutional entrepreneurs who
are required to (1) develop new business models and (2) shape
the institutional environment in order to implement these busi-
nessmodels. The institutional model of exchange that we have
presented has several implications for research and practice,
which we discuss in detail below.
Implications for theory
By focusing on how sellers create and maintain exchanges
with buyers, we extend the existing marketing theory of ex-
change in a more strategic and macro direction. While ex-
change has rightly been identified as a key aspect of marketing
(see Bagozzi 1974, 1975; Hunt 1983; Houston and
Gassenheim 1987; Vargo and Lusch 2004), the progress of a
theory of exchange has faltered, perhaps because marketing
scholars have adopted a neutral focus between buyers and
sellers in their theorizing about exchange. Specifically, insti-
tutions and the role of the seller (i.e., the marketer) in purpose-
fully shaping these institutions to facilitate exchange have
seldom been the focus of systematic analysis in marketing.
Yet, as our model elaborates, the seller has a key role to play
in making markets, especially in emerging economies. First, it
is the seller who develops a given business model that creates
and captures value for buyers. Second, perhaps more impor-
tantly, it is the seller who shapes the institutional context that
enables the successful implementation of that business model.
Extending marketing theory along these lines ensures that the
market-making role of marketers is better understood and em-
phasized. It also helps ensure that marketing continues to en-
gage with strategic and macro rather than merely tactical busi-
ness issues, and does not cede important conceptual terrain to
cognate fields such as strategy and organization theory on
topics that are so obviously core to marketing as a field (see
Reibstein et al. 2009; Kumar 2004; Varadarajan 2010; Day
1992; Mick 2007).
Our model also extends existing marketing theory to an
economically vital context that is rarely studied by marketing
researchers, namely exchange involving poor consumers in
emerging markets. By doing so, we call attention to a central
characteristic of such contexts, namely market failure, and
shed light upon when and why exchange happens (and when
and why it does not).
Studying such a context not only broadens the range of
phenomena to whichmarketing theory applies, it also enriches
what we know about more mainstream contexts such as mar-
keting to middle to high income consumers in developed
economies. Indeed, from a historical perspective, now-
developed economies were once emerging economies.
Specifically, even these countries, in earlier phases of their
development, faced institutional voids that resulted in market
failure. However, because most modern business research in
general, and marketing research in particular, has been con-
ducted in the developed economies of North America and
Western Europe, our theories have not typically incorporated
the role of institutions in facilitating market exchanges. It is
only now that business and marketing researchers are begin-
ning to study emerging markets that the crucial role of insti-
tutions and how they are built is coming into view. Further, it
is also true that some sectors of even developed economies
lack appropriate or adequate institutions to facilitate market
exchanges. BEmerging sectors^ such as drones, autonomous
vehicles, artificial intelligence, genetic engineering, etc., are
all so new that regulations and other market-facilitating insti-
tutions are yet to be formulated even in the West. Moreover,
even as these institutions are being created in the West, their
creation has to contend with the existence of legacy institu-
tions designed for prior, now outdated technological regimes.
The new regulations frequently come up against existing, out-
dated regulations making change hard.
It is here that emerging markets offer interesting new pos-
sibilities, even for developed economies. Emerging markets,
because they are often creating technological infrastructure
from scratch can leapfrog the West in this process, not only
in terms of the physical aspects but also in terms of the regu-
latory institutions. For instance, many emerging economies
leapfrogged straight to mobile telecommunications almost en-
tirely by-passing a prior land-line phase. They are now also
using the mobile infrastructure to leapfrog straight into mobile
banking without passing through the bricks-and-mortar bank-
ing phase. It is entirely likely that many developing countries
might create off-grid renewables infrastructures without ever
reaching full electrification through a centralized grid.
Emerging markets, in creating these technological infrastruc-
tures, have also been able to leapfrog developed economies in
terms of creating regulatory backbones to support these new
sectors. For instance, the Central Bank of Kenya was able to
create a regulatory space for a non-banking entity (the mobile
telecoms provider Safaricom) to provide financial services to
unbankedKenyan citizens. By applying an institutional model
to emerging industries in developed economies, marketing
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theorists can begin to formulate a more general theory of ex-
change that applies across economic contexts and income seg-
ments. A particularly interesting line of enquiry in this regard
concerns the relative importance of business model innovation
and institutional change in emerging relative to developed
economies.
Finally, our model highlights the type of work that mar-
keters need to perform in creating and shaping the institutions
needed to make exchange happen. The idea that marketers
often act as institutional entrepreneurs has rarely been ex-
plored (for a recent exception see Humphreys 2010). In part
this is because most marketing knowledge, whether academic
or practical, has been built in the context of or applied to
developed economies where the institutions needed to facili-
tate and maintain exchanges are typically well developed. By
focusing on how exchange happens in a context where the
institutions needed to facilitate exchange are fragmentary or
non-existent we emphasize the importance of incorporating
macro-level theorizing into marketing research. Marketing re-
search is typically focused at a micro-level of analysis (i.e. the
buyer-seller dyad). As a result, it often fails to take account of
broader social processes as well as key stakeholders that are
central to the exchange process, including actors in the finan-
cial, media and regulatory domains. Understanding how mar-
keting managers interact with their environment and develop
relationships with such stakeholders is arguably as important
as understanding how marketing mangers interact and devel-
op relationships with business customers and end consumers
(see Kotler 1986).
Implications for method
The model we outline in this paper offers several methodolog-
ical implications for marketing research. First, the complex,
interdependent and emerging nature of the phenomena we
study—exchanges with the poor, business model innovation
and institutional entrepreneurship—suggest the need for sig-
nificant grounded research into how market failure is over-
come and formal exchange with the poor is created and main-
tained across geographical, sectoral and cultural contexts. This
in turn suggests the need for deep ethnographies in order to
build a more complete theory of exchange that not only ex-
amines the buyer side of the exchange equation (see
Thompson et al. 2006; Fournier 1998; Holt 2002) but also that
of the seller. The use of ethnographic techniques to understand
seller rather than buyer behavior is a relatively undeveloped
area of marketing methodologically (see Viswanathan et al.
2010; Gebhardt et al. 2006) and our model provides a frame-
work to help guide such research.
Second, our model suggests significant opportunities for
quantitative research into howmarkets for the poor are created
and the impact that these markets have on the welfare of poor
consumers. Specifically, given that business models for
creating exchanges with the poor in fundamental areas such
as energy, health, financial services and education are only just
beginning to be implemented on a large scale (see Hammond
et al. 2007), opportunities exist for marketing researchers to be
present at the birth to conduct longitudinal field experiments
that examine the impact of such offerings on the lives of the
poor (see Levitt and List 2008). Such studies could shed light
on how regulatory or technological shocks have facilitated
exchange in emerging markets where formal exchanges did
not exist before, and the moderating or mediating role of mar-
keting in this process. Such quantitative studies, because they
enable the researcher to be present from birth, and to compare
outcomes in treatment relative to control groups in the field,
offer the opportunity to make strong inferences about cause
and effect in real environments (see Angrist and Krueger
2001). They thus leverage the internal validity of laboratory
experiments with the external validity provided by the field
setting. Such field experiments in emerging economies have
been rare in marketing although they are gaining influence in
areas such as development economics and finance (see Levitt
and List 2008).
Finally, our model suggests the opportunity of combining
quantitative and qualitative approaches by examining the role
that language and discursive processes play in institutional
work and exchange. Various aspects of institutional work such
as framing and legitimacy require key actors to make creative
use of language (Maguire et al. 2004; Phillips et al. 2004;
Zilber 2006; Maguire and Hardy 2009). Shaping existing in-
stitutions and creating new ones often requires agents to per-
suade actors in a particular institutional setting to adopt a new
system of meaning – a new way of thinking about a particular
issue – which creates a shared sense of purpose and identity,
and acts as a kind of social glue binding the key actors togeth-
er. Understanding how this is done offers marketing re-
searchers the opportunity to go beyond content analysis by
venturing into areas such as psycholinguistics and discourse
analysis in the study of market making (see Humphreys 2010;
Yadav et al. 2007).
Implications for practice
In the next few decades, global economic growth will be driv-
en by the emergingmarkets of Latin America, Africa and Asia
(Mahajan 2008; Mahajan and Banga 2006). The growth of
emerging markets will, in turn, be driven by the rise of the
Bnext four billion^ consumers as they make their way out of
poverty into relative affluence (see Hammond et al. 2007).
This large population of consumers offers huge opportunities
for multinationals and domestic, large and small businesses
alike. The model of exchange we develop suggests that man-
agers of firms seeking to engage the poor in emerging markets
would need to change at least three aspects of the way they go
about the business of marketing.
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First, our model suggests that firms seeking to make a
profit from exchanges with the poor will need to think
systemically about how they create and maintain ex-
changes with such consumers in emerging markets.
Specifically, firms will need to think about all aspects of
the business model needed to make such exchanges sus-
tainable in the long run. This will require managers not
only to think about the value proposition they offer to
poor consumers but also about how they organize their
operations in order to deliver this value proposition in a
financially viable way. Further, delivering the value prop-
osition will require systemic thinking around how to use
1) the product and price to deliver affordability to finan-
cially constrained consumers, 2) distribution to achieve
availability and accessibility for widely dispersed mar-
kets, and 3) promotion to educate consumers with rela-
tively low levels of awareness. Simply adopting existing
practices developed for affluent consumers in developed
economies will not work, given the significant differences
in lifestyle and incomes between such consumers and
those of the poor in emerging economies.
Second, our model suggests that implementing the busi-
ness models needed to facilitate exchanges with the poor in
emerging markets will require more than working with the
focal elements of exchange (the marketing mix) alone; it
will also require working with the contextual, institutional
elements that influence exchange. Specifically, firms market-
ing to the poor will need to be able to carry out the institu-
tional work needed to enable markets to function effectively.
This will involve learning how to frame problems and solu-
tions appropriately, working to create the necessary net-
works, negotiating and influencing regulators and policy
makers, and building legitimacy with investors, the media
and the public at large.
Finally, firms seeking to deliver value to the poor in
emerging markets will need to approach this challenge with
commitment and patience, and be willing to invest the nec-
essary time and resources. As our model suggests, taking
advantage of the opportunities offered by the poor in emerg-
ing markets is far from easy. Finding a business model that
works for both the buyer and the seller is hard enough;
implementing the business model by doing the necessary
institutional work is harder still. Firms hoping to commer-
cially dominate such markets in the long run will have to
treat these segments as more than mere beneficiaries of
short-term corporate social responsibility. Given the difficul-
ty of reaching consumers with relatively low levels of
awareness who are financially constrained and geographical-
ly dispersed, creating such markets is likely to involve much
experimentation and failure (see Yunus et al. 2010).
In sum, marketing and marketers are said to be facing a
crisis concerning the strategic relevance of the field on one
hand (see Reibstein et al. 2009; Kumar 2004; Varadarajan
2010; Day 1992), and its moral and social purpose on the
other (Mick 2007). Studying how to create and maintain ex-
changes with the poor, with a view to better managing such
markets and satisfying fundamental human needs, offers mar-
keting academics and practitioners the opportunity to develop
a renewed sense of purpose and clearly demonstrate the im-
portance of the field to business and society alike.
120 AMS Rev (2017) 7:101–122
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons At t r ibut ion 4 .0 In te rna t ional License (h t tp : / /
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appro-
priate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Aglionby, J.(2016). Lightbulb Moment for M-Kopa. Financial Times.
Access: https://www.ft.com/content/ccfaa1ba-d0f1-11e5-831d-
09f7778e7377.
Aldrich, H. E., & Fiol, C. M. (1994). Fools rush in? The institutional
context of industry creation. Academy of Management Review,
19(4), 645–670.
Amit, R., & Zott, C. (2001). Value creation in E-business. Strategic
Management Journal, 22(6–7), 493–520.
Anderson, J., & Markides, C. (2007). Strategic innovation at the base of
the pyramid. MIT Sloan Management Review, Fall, 83–88.
Anderson, J., Markides, C., &Martin, K. (2010). The last frontier: market
creation in conflict zones, deep rural areas, and urban slums.
California Management Review, 52(4), 1–23.
Angrist, J. D., & Krueger, A. B. (2001). Instrumental variables and the
search for identification: from supply and demand to natural exper-
iments. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(4), 69–85.
Baden-Fuller, C., & Morgan, M. S. (2010). Business Models as Models.
Long Range Planning, 43(2–3), 156–171.
Bagozzi, R. P. (1974). Marketing as an organized behavioral system of
exchange. Journal of Marketing, 38(4), 77–81.
Bagozzi, R. P. (1975). Marketing as exchange. Journal of Marketing,
39(4), 32–39.
Baker, S. M. (2009). Vulnerability and resilience in natural disasters: A
marketing and public policy perspective. Journal of Public Policy &
Marketing, 28(1), 114–123.
Bansal, P., & Clelland, I. (2004). Talking trash: Legitimacy, impression
management, and unsystematic risk in the context of the natural
environment. Academy of Management Journal, 47(1), 93–103.
Basu, P., & Srivastava, P. (2005). Scaling-up microfinance for India’s
rural poor, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3646.
Battilana, J., & Dorado, S. (2010). Building sustainable hybrid organiza-
tions: the case of commercial microfinance organizations. Academy
of Management Journal (forthcoming).
Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social
movements: an overview and assessment. Annual Review of
Sociology, 26(1), 611–639.
Casadesus-Masanell, R., & Ricart, J. E. (2010). From strategy to business
models and onto tactics. Long Range Planning, 43(2–3), 195–215.
Chaia, A., Dalal, A., Goland, T., Gonzalez, M.J., Morduch, J., & Schiff,
R. (2009). Half the world is unbanked. Financial Access Initiative
Framing Note. Access: http://mckinseyonsociety.com/downloads/
reports/Economic-Development/Half_the_world_is_unbanked.pdf.
Chandy, R., and Duke, L. (2011). Nick Hughes and M-Pesa. London
Business School Case Study.
Hoffman, A. J. (1999). Institutional evolution and change:
Environmentalism and the U.S. chemical industry. Academy of
Management Journal, 42(4), 351–371.
Holt, D. B. (2002). Why do Brands cause trouble? A dialectical theory of
consumer culture and branding. Journal of Consumer Research, 29,
70–90.
Houston, F. S., & Gassenheim, J. B. (1987). Marketing and exchange.
Journal of Marketing, 51(4), 3–18.
Humphreys, A. (2010). Megamarketing: The creation of markets as a
social process. Journal of Marketing, 74(2), 1–19.
Hunt, S. D. (1983). General theories and the fundamental Explananda of
marketing. Journal of Marketing, 47(4), 9–17.
Jack, W., & Suri. (2014). Risk sharing and transactions costs: Evidence
from Kenya’s mobile money revolution. The American Economic
Review, 104(1), 183–223.
Johar, G., & Harries, J. (2010). Dial 1298 for ambulance marketing EMS
in Mumbai. Columbia CaseWorks. http://acumen.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/03/1298-Ambulance-Columbia-B-School.pdf.
Karamchandani, A., Kubzansky, M., Frandano, P. (2009). Marketbased
solutions to the challenges of global poverty. Monitor Group.
Kashyap, P., & Raut, S. (2006). The rural marketing book (text/practice).
New Delhi: DreamTech Press.
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. (2000). Is group affiliation profitable in emerg-
ing markets? An analysis of diversified Indian business groups. The
Journal of Finance, 55, 867–891.
Kohli, A. K. (2009). From the editor: the state of the journal. Journal of
Marketing, 74(5), iii.
Kotler, P. (1986). Megamarketing.Harvard Business Review, 64(2), 117–
125.
Kotler, P., Wong, V., Saunders, J., Armstrong, G., &Wood,M. B. (2008).
Principles of marketing: Enhanced media (European ed.). London:
Prentice Hall.
Kumar, N. (2004). Marketing as strategy: Understanding the CEO's
agenda for driving growth and innovation. Cambridge: Harvard
Business School Press.
Lawrence, T. B., & Suddaby, R. (2006). Institutions and institutional
work. In S. R. Clegg, C. Hardy, T. B. Lawrence, & W. R. Nord
(Eds.),Handbook of Organizations Studies (2nd ed.). London: Sage.
Ledyard, J. O. (2008). Market Failure. In S. N. Durlauf & L. E. Blume
(Eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2nd edition).
Levitt, S., & List, J. (2008). Field experiments in economics: the past, the
present and the future. European Economic Review, 53(1), 1–18.
Levy, D., & Scully, M. (2007). The institutional entrepreneur as modern
prince: The strategic face of power in contested fields. Organization
Studies, 28(7), 971–991.
London, T. & Kotek, M. (2006). CEMEX’s Patrimonio Hoy: At the
Tipping Point? Ann Arbor, MI: WDI Publishing (formerly
Globalens) Case GL1-428-606D.
London, T., Parker, J., Korona, J. (2012). Constructing a base-of-the
pyramid business in a multinational corporation: CEMEX’s
Patrimonio hoy. Michigan Ross Business School Case Study.
Maguire, S., & Hardy, C. (2009). Discourse and deinstitutionalization:
The decline of DDT. Academy of Management Journal, 52(1), 148–
178.
Maguire, S., Hardy, C., & Lawrence, T. B. (2004). Institutional entrepre-
neurship in emerging fields: HIV/AIDS treatment advocacy in
Canada. Academy of Management Journal, 47(5), 657–679.
Mahadevan, B. (2000). Business models for internet-based E-commerce:
An anatomy. California Management Review, 42(4), 55–69.
Mahajan, V. (2008). Africa rising: How 900 million African consumers
offer more than you think. NJ: Wharton School Publishing.
Mahajan, V., & Banga, K. (2006). The 86 percent solution: How to suc-
ceed in the biggest market opportunity of the next 50 years. Upper
Saddle River: Wharton School.
McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1996). Introduction: op-
portunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes – toward a
AMS Rev (2017) 7:101–122 121
Chaudhary, B., Modi, A., & Reddy, K. (2012). Right to sight: a manage-
ment case study on Aravind eye hospitals. International Journal of
Multidisciplinary Research, 2(1), 447–457.
Cohen, B. D., & Dean, T. J. (2005). Information asymmetry and investor
valuation of IPOs: Top management team legitimacy as a capital
market signal. Strategic Management Journal, 26(7), 683–690.
Crainer, S. (2013). M-KOPA: Let There Be Light | London Business
School. London Business School Review. Access: https://www.
london.edu/faculty-and-research/lbsr/m-kopa-let-there-be-light#.
WYWFEIrTVzB.
Dacin, M. T., Goodstein, J., & Richard Scott, W. (2002). Institutional
theory and institutional change: Introduction to the special research
forum. Academy of Management Journal, 45(1), 43–56.
Daft, R.L., & Lewin, A.Y. (1993). Where Are the Theories for TheB new^
organizational Forms? An Editorial Essay. Organization Science,
4(4), i–vi.
Darden, L. (1991). Theory Change in Science: Strategies fromMendelian
Genetics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Day, G. S. (1992). Marketing’s contribution to the strategy dialogue.
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 20, 323–330.
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell,W.W. (Eds.). (1991). The new institutionalism
in organizational analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Dupas, P., & Robinson, J. (2010). Savings constraints and microenter-
prise development: evidence from a field experiment in Kenya,
NBERWorking Paper #14693.
Fournier, S. (1998). Consumers and their brands: Developing relationship
theory in consumer research. Journal of Consumer Research, 24,
343–353.
Garud, R., Jain, S., & Kumaraswamy, A. (2002). Institutional entrepre-
neurship in the sponsorship of common technological standards: the
case of sun Microsystems and java. Academy of Management
Journal, 45(1), 196–214.
Garud, R., Kumaraswamy, A., & Langlois, R. N. (Eds.). (2003).
Managing in the modular age: Architectures, networks and
organizations. Oxford: Blackwell.
Gebhardt, G. F., Carpenter, G. S., & Sherry Jr., J. F. (2006). Creating a
market orientation: A longitudinal, multifirm, grounded analysis of
cultural transformation. Journal of Marketing, 70(4), 37–55.
Greenwood, R., & Hinings, C. R. (1996). Understanding radical organi-
zational change: Bringing together the old and the new institution-
alism. Academy of Management Review, 21(4), 1022–1054.
Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Sahlin, K., & Suddaby, R. (Eds.). (2008). The
sage handbook of organizational institutionalism. Los Angeles:
Sage.
Hammond, A., Kramer, W., Katz, R., Tran, J., Walker, C. (2007). The
next four billion: Market size and business strategy at the base of the
pyramid. World Resources Institute. Access: http://www.wri.org/
publication/next-4-billion.
Hannan, M. T., & Carroll, G. (1992). Dynamics of organizational popu-
lations: Density, legitimation, and competition. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Hargadon, A. B., & Douglas, J. Y. (2001). When innovations meet insti-
tutions: Edison and the Design of the Electric Light. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 46(3), 476–501.
Hargrave, T., & Van de Ven, A. H. (2006). A collective action model of
institutional change. Academy of Management Review, 31(4), 864–
888.
Hensmans, M. (2003). Social movement organizations: A metaphor for
strategic actors in institutional fields. Organization Studies, 24(3),
355–381.
Hiatt, S. R., Sine, W. D., & Tolbert, P. S. (2009). From Pabst to Pepsi: The
deinstitutionalization of social practices and the creation of entrepre-
neurial opportunities. Administrative Science Quarterly, 54(4), 635–
667.
synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements. In D.
McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, & M. N. Zald (Eds.), Comparative
Perspectives on Social Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Mick, D. G. (2007). The end(s) of marketing and the neglect of moral
responsibility by the American marketing association. Journal of
Public Policy and Marketing, 26(2), 289–292.
Miller, D. (2009). Selling solar: The diffusion of renewable energy in
emerging markets. London: Earthscan.
Mitchell, D., & Coles, C. (2003). The ultimate competitive advantage of
continuing business model innovation. Journal of Business Strategy,
24(5), 15–21.
Osterwalder, A., Pigneur, Y., & Tucci, C. L. (2005). Clarifying business
models: Origins, present, and future of the concept. Communications
of the Association for Information Systems, 16(1), 1.
Pauwels, K., Erguncu, S., & Yildirim, G. (2013). Winning hearts, minds
and sales: How marketing communication enters the purchase pro-
cess in emerging and mature markets. International Journal of
Research in Marketing, 30(1), 57–68.
Pearl, D., & Phillips, M. (2001). Grameen Bank, which pioneered loans
for the poor, has hit a repayment snag. Wall Street Journal. Access:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1006810274155982080.
Phillips, N., Lawrence, T. B., & Hardy, C. (2004). Discourse and institu-
tions. Academy of Management Review, 29(4), 635–652.
Pollock, T. G., & Rindova, V. P. (2003). Media legitimation effects in the
market for initial public offerings. Academy of Management
Journal, 46(5), 631–642.
Prahalad, C. K. (2010). The fortune at the bottom of the pyramid:
Eradicating poverty through profits. Philadelphia: Wharton School
Publishing.
Prahalad, C.K., & Mashelkar, R.A. (2010). Innovation’s holy grail.
Harvard Business Review, 1–9. Publishing/Pearson Education.
Rangan, V.K. (2009). The Aravind Eye Hospital, Madurai, India: In
Service for Sight. Harvard Business School Publishing.
Rangan, K., & Rajan, R. (2007). Unilever in India: Project Shakti.
Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing.
Reibstein, D. J., Day, G., &Wind, J. (2009). Guest editorial: Is marketing
academia losing its way? Journal of Marketing, 73(4), 1–3.
Sadoulet, L., & Furdelle, O. (2014). Vodafone M-PESA: unusual
innovation - from a corporate social responsibilty project to
business model innovation, INSEAD Case Study. https://
centres.insead.edu/social-innovation/what-we-do/documents/
INSEADSocialInnovationCentre5693-Vodafone_MPESA-CS-
EN-0-09-2014-w.pdf.
Segel, A., Chu, M., & Herrero, G. (2006). Patrimonio Hoy. Harvard
Business School Case 805-064.
Sheth, J. N. (2011). ‘Impact of Emerging Markets on Marketing:
Rethinking Existing Perspectives and Practices’. Journal of
Marketing, 75(4), 166–182.
Sivakumar, B. (2015). 27% of Deaths in India for Want of Medical
Attention. ETHealthworld.Com. http://health.economictimes.
indiatimes.com/news/industry/27-of-deaths-in-india-for-want-of-
medical-attention/49481480. Accessed 4 August.
Stuart, T. E., Hoang, H., & Hybels, R. C. (1999). Interorganizational
endorsements and the performance of entrepreneurial ventures.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(2), 315–349.
Tanaka, N., Kjorven, O., Yumkella, K. (2010). Energy poverty: how to
makemodern energy access universal. In IEAWorld EnergyOutlook
(WEO) 2010. Access: http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/
weowebsite/2010/weo2010_poverty.pdf.
Teece, D. J. (2010). Business models, business strategy and innovation.
Long Range Planning, 43(2–3), 172–194.
The Economic Times (2008). RBI lays down norms for mobile banking.
Access: http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/
finance/banking/rbi-lays-down-norms-for-mobile-banking/
articleshow/3504396.cms.
Thompson, J. D., & MacMillan, I. C. (2010). Business models: Creating
new markets and societal wealth. Long Range Planning, 43(2–3),
291–307.
Thompson, C. J., Rindfleisch, A., &Arsel, Z. (2006). Emotional branding
and the strategic value of the Doppelgänger brand image. Journal of
Marketing, 70(1), 50–64.
Tracey, P., & Phillips, N. (2011). Entrepreneurship in emerging mar-
kets: Strategies for new venture creation in uncertain institu-
tional contexts. Management International Review. doi:10.
1007/s11575-010-0066-8.
Tracey, P., Phillips, N., & Jarvis, O. (2010). Bridging institutional entre-
preneurship and the creation of new organizational forms: A multi-
level model. Organization Science. doi:10.1287/orsc.1090.0522.
Van de Ven, A. H., & Garud, R. (1993). Innovation and industry devel-
opment: The case of Cochlear implants. Research on Technological
Innovation, Management and Policy, 5, 1–46.
Van de Ven, A. H., Polley, D. E., Garud, R., & Venkataraman, S. (1999).
The innovation journey. New York: Oxford University Press.
Van de Ven, A. H., Angle, H. L., & Poole, M. S. (2000a). Research on the
Management of Innovation: The Minnesota studies. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Van de Ven, A. H., Poole, M. S., Dooley, K., & Holmes, M. E. (2000b).
Organizational change and innovation processes: Theory and
methods for research. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Varadarajan, R. (2010). Strategic marketing and marketing strategy:
Domain, definition, fundamental issues and foundational premises.
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 38, 119–140.
Vargo, S. L., & Lusch, R. F. (2004). Evolving to a new dominant logic for
marketing. Journal of Marketing, 68(1), 1–17.
Viswanathan, M., Rosa, J. A., & Ruth, J. A. (2010). Exchanges in mar-
keting systems: The case of subsistence consumer-merchants in
Chennai, India. Journal of Marketing, 74(3), 1–17.
Wijen, F., & Ansari, S. (2007). Overcoming inaction through collective
institutional entrepreneurship: Insights from regime theory.
Organization Studies, 28(7), 1079–1100.
Wu, J. (2013). Marketing capabilities, institutional development, and the
performance of emerging market firms: A multinational study.
International Journal of Research in Marketing, 30(1), 36–45.
Yadav, M. S. (2010). The decline of conceptual articles and implications
for knowledge development. Journal of Marketing, 74(1), 1–19.
Yadav, M. S., Prabhu, J. C., & Chandy, R. K. (2007). Managing the
future: CEO attention and innovation outcomes. Journal of
Marketing, 71(4), 84–101.
Yunus, M., Moingeon, B., & Lehmann-Ortega, L. (2010). Building social
business models: Lessons from the Grameen experience. Long
Range Planning, 43(2–3), 308–325.
Zilber, T. B. (2006). The work of the symbolic in institutional processes:
Translations of rational myths in Israeli high tech. Academy of
Management Journal, 49(2), 281–303.
Zott, C., & Amit, R. (2008). Exploring the fit between business strategy
and business model: Implications for firm performance. Strategic
Management Journal, 29(1), 1–26.
Zott, C., Amit, R., & Massa, L. (2011). The business model: Recent
developments and future research. Journal of Management, 37(4),
1019–1042.
122 AMS Rev (2017) 7:101–122
